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ABSTRACT 
Employing systematic document analysis and other methods, this article analyses a 
long-standing and still relevant issue related to the interpretation and application of the law 
regulating relationships in the field of European Union criminal justice within the framework 
of the national criminal proceedings that are taking place in EU member states. The article 
places special emphasis on the explanation and application of the principle of mutual 
recognition within the framework of one of the newest instruments of international 
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cooperation in the European Union criminal proceedings meant to prevent conflicts of 
exercise of jurisdiction and to solve issues arising between two or more member states. The 
analysis of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction provided in this paper is not limited to a mere 
explanation of the concept as such, but includes an essential analysis of other related issues, 
such as the principle of mutual recognition, its influence on the recognition of criminal 
proceedings as parallel proceedings, and including other aspects related to the matching of 
the form of national criminal proceedings with the criminal proceedings taking place in 
another member state.  Finally, significant attention is given to one of the objectives in terms 
of prevention and solution of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction, namely, the ne bis in idem 
principle and its application in case of parallel criminal proceedings taking place in two or 
more member states. One of the key conclusions offered here is that in order to eliminate 
conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction, positive law in the process of conflicts of jurisdiction must 
become an effective measure in criminal justice; however, only on the condition that at least 
a minimum likelihood in the form of criminal proceedings adopted by different EU members 
states is ensured as a precondition necessary to enable a smooth application of the principle 
of mutual recognition. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Criminal proceedings, parallel proceedings, jurisdiction, collision, the principle of neb is 
in idem  
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In the context of criminal justice, relationships between European Union 
member states are viewed as one element in the process of Europeanisation. How 
can this element be turned into an effective and productive tool aimed at 
strengthening the human rights protection mechanism. The dynamic 
Europeanisation of criminal justice has become an object of recent scientific 
discussions.1 It is often highly criticized for efforts to harmonize and simplify the 
criminal proceedings of the European Union member states by choosing the 
quickest and most effective ways to achieve goals. 
In the discussions the concept of Europeanisation in criminal justice is 
commonly viewed as something encompassing the process of interpretation, 
division, and institutionalization of formal and non-formal rules, including processes 
related to political paradigms. It also includes ways to incorporate the legal 
provisions that are born in the European Union public policy area into national legal 
systems. N. Hoppe provides further explanation of the concept within the legal 
context and claims that the essence of Europeanisation is the percolation of the 
legal provisions formed and developed on the European Union level into the 
national legal systems of member states. At the same time the author questions 
the uniformity of the outcomes of the percolation for the EU member states.2 Hoppe 
reminds us of the views on Europeanisation that were prevalent in the early days of 
the phenomenon, i.e. the mid-1950s. As H.J.J. Leenen puts it, “with time the 
divided Europe will become more and more united. National states will not 
disappear, but become more and more dependent on each other.”3 That is, 
                                           
1 Raimundas Jurka, “Europos teisės įtaka Lietuvos baudžiamajam procesui” [The Influence of European 
Law into Lithuanian Criminal Procedure]: 70; in: Raimundas Jurka, et al., Baudžiamojo proceso 
tarptautiškumas: patirtis ir iššūkiai [The Internationalization of Criminal Procedure: Experience and 
Challenges] (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 2013); Rima Ažubalytė and Karolina Vozbutaitė, 
“Baudžiamojo proceso europeizacija: kai kurie konstituciniai ir procesiniai Europos arešto orderio 
reglamentavimo ir taikymo aspektai” [Europeization of Criminal Procedure: some Issues of Constitutional 
and Procedural Apects of European Arrest Warrant Regulation and Application]; in: Raimundas Jurka, et 
al., Baudžiamojo proceso tarptautiškumas: patirtis ir iššūkiai [The Internationalization of Criminal 
Procedure: Experience and Challenges] (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 2013); Birgit M. 
Sittermann, “Nachwuchsgruppe Europäische Zivilgesellschaft und Multi-Level Governance” 
[Europeanisation – A Step Forward in Understanding Europe?] (Münster, 2011) // http://nez.uni-
muenster.de/download/Sittermann_Literature_Review_Europeanisation_FINAL2006.pdf; François 
Kristen, “Special Issue on Changing Approaches and Power in Criminal Justice,” Utrecht Law Review 7 
(3) (2012): 3; Piet Eeckhout, “The Growing Influence of European Union Law,” Fordham International 
Law Journal 33(5) (2011); Ester Herlin-Karnell, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Criminal Law and 
Justice,” European Policy Anglysis 3 (2008); Chris Hilson, “The Europeanization of English Administrative 
Law: Judicial Review and Convergence,” European Public Law 9 (1) (2003): 128; Jan M. Smits, “The 
Europeanisation of National Legal Systems: Some Consequences for Legal Thinking in Civil Law 
Countries”; in: Mark Van Hoecke, ed., Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2004). 
2 Nils Hoppe, “On the Europeanization of Health Law,” European Journal of Health Law 17 (2010): 323, 
324; Claudio M. Radaelli, The Europeanization of Public Policy. The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford 
university press, 2003), 27-56. 
3 Nils Hoppe, supra note 2: 327. 
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dependent on each other in so far as it is necessary to reach common goals in 
crime prevention, effectively fight against the phenomenon, and wield common 
instruments to fight crime. The “dependence” is explained in the context of positive 
responsibility, which means that member states shall take all measures necessary 
to “harmonize” national judicial criminal proceedings. All of it is aimed at creating a 
common area of justice where national borders of the European Union member 
states start “fading” as far as the administration of justice is concerned, but without 
breaching the member states’ sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that a hasty matching of national legal 
systems of the European Union member states, especially in cases when member 
states are not ready to demonstrate mutual trust in each other, often results in 
problems related to theoretical and practical application of the law. It seems like 
this issue is unavoidable even when the European Union legal mechanisms meant 
to deal with conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings between two 
or more member states are in place. Certainly, this type of legal regulation is 
comparatively new and there is no solid legal practice in the area. Moreover, 
scientific discussions on various aspects of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings are still ongoing. Concepts like parallel criminal proceedings 
and assessment of practical settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction are especially 
controversial. These questions are settled in Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 
30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of 
jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, but, as could be seen in the Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by 
the Member States of Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on 
prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal 
proceedings: 
The non-implementation of the Framework Decisions by some Member States is 
problematic since those Member States who have properly implemented the 
Framework Decisions cannot benefit from their co-operation provisions in their 
relations with those Member States who did not implement them in time. 
Indeed, the principle of mutual recognition, which is the cornerstone of the 
European area of justice that this Framework Decision facilitates, cannot work if 
instruments are not implemented correctly in all Member States concerned. As a 
consequence, when cooperating with a Member State who did not implement in 
time, even those Member States who did so will have to rely on the random and 
often lengthy practice of traditional mutual legal assistance in criminal matters 
without a reliable guarantee of a timely detection of bis in idem cases, which 
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should already take place at early stages of criminal proceedings. Such a 
practice increases significantly a risk of double jeopardy.4 
The aforementioned problems related to the implementation and application 
of the provisions of European Union law within national legal frameworks reinforce 
the concern that even if member states harmonize their criminal law with the 
Community’s, aquis problems related to their practical application will remain 
unsolved. As for the provisions of the Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA, 
the unclear definitions contained therein, including the unjustified broad treatment 
and flexible nature thereof, which often results in practical side effects faced by law 
enforcement and judicial institutions, cause a lot of doubt. The analysis provided in 
this article shows that member states that are working on settling conflicts of 
exercise of jurisdiction have to agree on the uniformity of some legal instruments, 
which seem to be impeccable on the outside. However, the so-called seamy side of 
the tapestry5, i.e. what lies behind the legal instruments, makes us stop and think 
whether parallel criminal proceedings are something that can be avoided by way of 
proper application of the ne bis in idem principle and whether the proceedings are 
actually so similar in their form and minimum procedural guarantees that the 
member states willing to avoid conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction can boldly say 
that they have mutual trust in each other without any reservation, i.e. that they 
apply the principle of mutual recognition without any further claims involved. 
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF NE BIS IN IDEM IN THE CONTEXT OF 
JURISDICTION CONFLICTS  
The principle of ne bis in idem6  is often viewed as a prohibition to impose a 
repeated punishment for the same crime, and also as a prohibition to initiate 
repeated criminal prosecution for the same crime or all of the above prohibitions in 
their entirety.7 It is worth to noting that: 
                                           
4 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by the 
Member States of Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and 
settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (COM(2014)313 final) (2014) // 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/law/files/report_conflicts_jurisdiction_en.pdf. 
5 As a philosopher A. Schopenhauer would say, “from the front side of the tapestry, but also from its 
seamy side, i.e. from the underneath side, on which all binds, raggedness and woven threads are seen” 
(Arthur Schopenhauer, Gyvenimo išminties aforizmai [The Aphorisms of the Wisdom of Life] (Vilnius: 
Tyto Alba, 2007), 236). 
6 The Latin saying ne bis in idem or non bis in idem means “no two times for the same”. For the purpose 
of this article the Latin phrase ne bis in idem is used. 
7 Edita Gruodytė, “Teisingumas baudžiamajame procese Europos Teisingumo Teismo akimis: atskiri non 
bis in idem principo aspektai” [Justice in Criminal procedure in the Eyes of the European Court of Justice: 
Some Aspects of the Principle non bis in idem]: 20; in: Baudžiamasis procesas: teisingumo garantas ar 
kliūtis? [Criminal Procedure: the Guarantee of Justice or the Barrier?] (Vilnius: UAB “Vilniaus panda”, 
2014). 
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The rationale of the ne bis in idem principle is manifold. It is of course a principle 
of judicial protection for the citizen against the ius puniendi of the state and as 
such is part of the principles of due law and fair trial. On the other hand respect 
for the res judicata (pro veritate habitur) of final judgments is of importance for 
the legitimacy of the legal system and of the state.8 
The ne bis in idem principle is found in lex talionis. It has never been 
forgotten within the framework of European Union criminal justice and is gradually 
gaining in importance.9 
The principle of ne bis in idem was consolidated in domestic law on November 
22, 1984, by the signing of Protocol No 7 of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.10 The application of the ne bis in idem principle in relations 
between member states has been provided for in the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (hereinafter – the Schengen Convention)11. Finally, the ne bis 
in idem principle has been consolidated into the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter – the Charter)12 as a tool to prevent repeated 
punishment imposed by a court of the same or any other member state in cases 
related to the European Union law. 
Despite the fact that the aforementioned documents include slightly different 
descriptions of the ne bis in idem principle, they consolidate the principle as 
consisting of two parts: bis (the same acts) and idem (finally disposed of). This 
article is not aimed at an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (hereinafter – the ECJ) and that of the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter – the ECHR) to identify the way these two courts interpret bis 
and idem.13 Nevertheless, in order to establish ways to solve the problems dealt 
with in this article, it is first of all necessary to review some key aspects in the 
interpretation of bis and idem. It is stated that: 
The concept of idem relates to the elements which must be regarded as having already 
formed the subject-matter of a judgment. This may, understood in a manner which is 
advantageous to the individual, include identity solely of the material acts or, with a 
                                           
8 John A.E. Vervaele, “The Transnational ne bis in idem Principle in the EU Mutual Recognition and 
Equivalent Protection of Human Rights,” Utrecht Law Review 1 (2) (2005): 100. 
9 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 7 September 2010 in Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello 
// http://www.infolex.lt/estzv2/default.aspx?pg=31&crd=34047&lng=LT. 
10 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, Article 4 // http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/117.htm. 
11 The Schengen acquis – Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between 
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000: 19–
62. 
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OL C 326, 2012 10 26: 391–407, Article 50. 
13 Edita Gruodytė, supra note 7. 
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stricter meaning, identity of the offences, that is to say those acts together with their 
legal classification.14 
Regarding the interpretation of idem, the ECJ decided that the decisive 
criterion shall be the overlapping of material acts, which is perceived as the entirety 
of inseparable interrelated acts, irrespective of the legal classification of these acts 
or the legal interest that is to be protected.15 When speaking about drug-related 
crimes, the ECJ stated that there is no requirement for the material acts resulting 
from criminal offences committed in several member states or for the individuals 
who committed them to be identical. Therefore, it is possible to have a case where 
there is no identical coincidence in terms of acts or perpetrators, however, the case 
involves an entirety of acts that are interrelated in time, space and the subject 
matter. Moreover, the ECJ emphasized that the final assessment on the issue is to 
be given by a competent national court.16 
The ECJ practice17 related to the interpretation of idem defines only the 
minimum scope of application of the ne bis in idem principle in relations between 
member states. Article 54 of the Schengen Convention does not preclude the 
application of broader national provisions of the ne bis in idem principle with regard 
to judicial decisions taken abroad (Article 58 of the Schengen Convention). The 
scientific analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence also confirms that idem is established 
by: 
Assessing specific material acts by way of factual totality test applied to acts 
that are interrelated in time, space and subject matter, while the content of the 
test is to be determined by a competent national court. This gives a lot of 
freedom for interpretation and makes it evident that it is possible to have 
situations where essentially identical acts are viewed differently in different 
members states, which might result in absolutely different court rulings.18 
In its interpretation of idem the ECHR followed the ECJ practice, which says 
that, as mentioned previously, only material acts shall be taken into consideration, 
irrespective of the legal classification of these acts or the legal interest that is to be 
protected.19 
The concept of bis defines the decisions20 to which the ne bis in idem principle 
may apply. The ECJ holds the opinion that the ne bis in idem principle shall apply in 
                                           
14 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, supra note 9. 
15 Van Esbroeck, Court of Justice Judgment of 9 March 2006, C-436/04. 
16 Van Straaten, Court of Justice Judgment of 28 September 2006, C-150/05. 
17 See Gasparini and Others, Court of Justice Judgment of 28 September 2006, C-467/04; Jurgen 
Kretzinger, Court of Justice Judgment of 18 July 2007, C-288/05; Norma Kraaijiebrink and Others, Court 
of Justice Judgment of 18 July 2007, C-367/05. 
18 Edita Gruodytė, supra note 7: 26. 
19 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], Eur Court HR, no. 14939/03, § 83, ECHR 2009. 
20 Article 4 of Protocol No 7 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 54 
of the Schengen Convention and Article 50 of the Charter include a mention of acquittal or conviction. 
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cases when a court acquits or sentences a plaintiff as a result of examining a case 
on its merits. This includes cases of conviction in absentia21 and cases when a 
plaintiff is acquitted on the basis of the absence of evidence resulting from 
examining a case on its merits.22 The ne bis in idem principle is also applied in 
cases when the proceedings are terminated in a particular member state because 
prosecution of a particular offence has become time-barred there, despite the fact 
that in another member state the same case has not become time-barred yet.23 
With regard to this particular case the ECJ stated that every member state shall 
accept the criminal law of the other member state the way it is applied in that 
particular member state, despite the fact that the application of its own criminal law 
would entail a rather different decision.24 
The ECJ stated that the ne bis in idem principle shall also apply to decisions 
that have not been passed by a court and that do not have a form of a court 
decision and yet finally dispose of the prosecution.25 In the case of Turanský26, the 
ECJ defined a criterion that helps determine whether the prosecution is finally 
disposed of: 
First of all it must be verified [...] whether according to the national law of the 
Contracting State the officials of which passed the decision it is considered to be 
final and binding or not, and to make sure that in this particular state the ne bis 
in idem principle is safeguarded. […] The protection comes into force only if at 
least one of the states passes a final decision that has the force of res judicata.27 
The ECHR holds the same position on the matter: a decision that has the 
force of res judicata has to be passed, i.e. “[...] in cases when there is no 
opportunity to make use of the usual remedies or in cases when states have 
exhausted all usual remedies or exceeded the time limit set for making use of the 
usual remedies.”28 
Currently national institutions may engage in parallel prosecution for the 
same crime without any limitations. The only legal barrier that could prevent this 
from happening is the ne bis in idem principle. However, this principle, which has 
been extensively analyzed in the jurisprudence of the ECJ: 
                                                                                                                           
However, Article 54 of the Schengen Convention further explains that a conviction shall be executed, be 
in the process of execution or is not possible to be executed any more in line with the laws of the state 
in which it has been passed. 
21 Bourquain, Court of Justice Judgment of 11 December 2008, C-297/07. 
22 Van Straaten, supra note 16. 
23 Gasparini and Others, supra note 17. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Vladimir Turansky, Court of Justice Judgment of 22 December 2008, C-491/07. 
26 Ibid.; see M, Court of Justice Judgment of 5 Juni 2014, C-398/12. 
27 Edita Gruodytė, supra note 7: 32. 
28 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, supra note 19. 
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Does not prevent conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in cases when criminal 
prosecution for the same crime is ongoing in two or more member states. It 
may help prevent the institution of repeated prosecution for the same crime if a 
decision barring repeated proceedings (res judicata) has been passed thus 
finally disposing of the judicial proceedings.29 
Additionally, it is emphasized that: 
In the absence of a system enabling to hand cases over to an appropriate 
jurisdiction in situations when the proceedings are already ongoing, the 
application of the ne bis in idem principle may result in accidental and even 
arbitrary consequences, i.e. by giving preference to whichever jurisdiction can 
first take a final decision, its effects amount to a “first come first served” 
principle.30 
However, the principle of ne bis in idem does not constitute an obstacle to 
reopening a criminal case if new material facts or proof emerge.31 In that case the 
question of jurisdiction remains open again. The case must be reopened in the 
member state that passed the “final decision.” It is so because, due to some 
peculiarities of national courts related to the assessment of particulars of the case, 
the courts of the member state that was not involved in passing the “final decision” 
cannot freely decide on the use of material received from the member state which 
passed the “final decision”.32 
It is therefore obvious that in the aforementioned cases member states start 
“competing” for the right to criminal prosecution, i.e. conflicts of exercise of 
jurisdiction in criminal proceedings are feasible and the ne bis in idem principle 
“does not serve as an appropriate substitute of the agreed criteria that form the 
basis for solving conflicts of the kind”.33 
 
 
                                           
29 John A.E. Vervaele, “The Transnational ne bis in idem Principle in the EU Mutual Recognition and 
Equivalent Protection of Human Rights,” Common Market Law Review 41 (2004): 804. As professor John 
A. E. Vervaele noted also: 
The ECJ states explicitly that the area of Freedom, Security and Justice implies mutual 
trust in each other’s criminal justice systems and that the validity of the ne bis in idem 
principle is not dependent upon further harmonization. The ECJ further considers that the 
intentions of the Contracting Schengen Parties are no longer of value, as they predate the 
integration of the Schengen acquis in the EU. It is the ECJ which, through interpretation of 
the principles of the Community legal order, has to define the legal principles and 
determine their scope and application. The ECJ’s preliminary ruling in cases C-187/01 and 
C-385/01, Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, has made clear that the ECJ is prepared to 
play this role, just as it has played it in the process of the integration of the Community 
(ibid.: 808). 
30 Ibid.: 809. 
31 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 6 February 2014 in Case C-398/12, Procura della 
Repubblica v M., par. 59 // http://www.infolex.lt/estzv2/default.aspx?pg=31&crd=16150&lng=LT. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., par.51. 
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2. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS: IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT 
The proper definition of any concept, be it an act, an event, or a 
phenomenon, determines proper understanding of the goals attached to an object 
chosen for research, which allows the formation of a systematic perception of its 
nature, features, relations with other objects, and how well they go together. Thus, 
when analyzing issues related to the conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction as part of 
the European Union criminal proceedings, it is essential to properly define parallel 
proceedings with the aim to get a better understanding of varied legal traditions 
characteristic of the multitude of legal systems that exist in European Union 
member states. 
As stated in the Article 3 of Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of November 
30, 2009, on prevention and settlement of conflicts of the exercise of jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings, parallel proceedings means criminal proceedings, including 
both the pre-trial and the trial phases, which are conducted in two or more Member 
States concerning the same facts and involving the same person. It seems like this 
piece of legislation gives a rather clear definition of the elements that constitute the 
concept of parallel criminal proceedings going on in several member states. The 
Green Paper, however, when speaking about the concept of exercise of jurisdiction 
and ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings states, among other things, that: 
EU criminal justice is increasingly confronted with situations where several 
Member States have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute the same case. Moreover, 
multiple prosecutions on the same cases, or “positive” conflicts of jurisdiction, 
are currently more likely to occur as the scope of many national criminal 
jurisdictions has been extended considerably in the past years. Multiple 
prosecutions are detrimental to the rights and interests of individuals and can 
lead to duplication of activities. […]. Currently, national authorities are free to 
institute their own parallel prosecutions on the same cases. The only legal 
barrier is the principle of ne bis in idem.34  
However, this principle, which is widely has been analyzed in the 
jurisprudence of European Court of Justice,  
does not prevent conflicts of jurisdiction while multiple prosecutions are ongoing 
in two or more Member States; it can only come into play, by preventing a 
second prosecution on the same case, if a decision which bars a further 
prosecution (res judicata) has terminated the proceedings in a Member State.35 
Finally this paper emphasizes that: 
                                           
34 Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings 
(COM/2005/0696 final), Bulletin/2005/12/1.4.18, JO C/2006/70/5. 
35 Ibid. 
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without a system for allocating cases to an appropriate jurisdiction while 
proceedings are ongoing, ne bis in idem can lead to accidental or even arbitrary 
results: by giving preference to whichever jurisdiction can first take a final 
decision, its effects amount to a “first come first served” principle. The choice of 
jurisdiction is currently left to chance, and this seems to be the reason why the 
principle of ne bis in idem is still subject to several exceptions.36 
However, when analyzing conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal 
proceedings, the concept of “parallel proceedings” does not seem to be self-
explanatory. The area and context of application of the aforementioned Framework 
Decision 2009/948/JHA are even less self-explanatory. It is not enough merely to 
consider the entirety of circumstances in relation to the same individual or 
individuals that are considered to be plaintiffs in criminal proceedings taking place 
in two or more member states, which is supposed to help identify parallel 
proceedings idem per idem, because the discussion on the acceptability of the 
principle of mutual recognition on the European Union level has not been finalized 
yet.37 
Scientific sources show that parallel proceedings are only formally identical. 
Moreover, their similarity content-wise is meager. Authors analyzing conflicts of 
exercise of jurisdiction note that parallel proceedings result from the fact that two 
or more member states have jurisdiction over crimes that were committed in more 
than one member state, including crimes that result in negative consequences in at 
least two member states, and crimes that were committed by a citizen of another 
member state or which a citizen of another member state fell victim to.38 Often 
parallel proceedings are perceived as simultaneous proceedings resulting from acts 
or events that have identical characteristics and are related with the same actors in 
criminal proceedings.39 They are two different proceedings, be they different or 
identical in kind. They also encompass acts determined by the same events or 
                                           
36 Ibid. 
37 There are two different positions on the matter. One of them supports the principle as a cornerstone 
of International cooperation, yet another one, to the contrary, claims that the principle of mutual 
recognition in the EU law diminishes the authenticity, sovereignty and autonomy of national domestic 
law (Raimundas Jurka, “Tarptautinis bendradarbiavimas baudžiamajame procese: įrodymai ir jų 
priimtinumas Europos Sąjungoje” [International Cooperation in Criminal Procedure: Evidence and Its 
Acceptability]: 103; in: Vidmantas Egidijus Kurapka, et al., Baudžiamasis procesas: nuo teorijos iki 
įrodinėjimo (prof. dr. Eugenijaus Palskio atminimui [Criminal Procedure: from Theory towards Evidence 
making procedure (in memoriam prof. Eugenijus Palskys] (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 
2011)). 
38 Polyvios Panayides, “Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings: Analysis and Possible 
Improvements to the EU Legal Framework,” Revue internationale de droit penal 77 (1) (2006): 113. 
39 Mark D. Hunter, “SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of Recent Judicial 
Trends,” Missouri Law Review 68 (2003): 149; Stephen P. Younger and Jenya Moshkovich, “Parallel 
Proceedings in Securities Enforcement Actions: The Growing Trend against Automatic Grants of 
Government Requests for Stays of Civil Cases,” Journal of Securities Law, Regulation & Compliance 3 (4) 
(2010): 307; J. Brook Lathram and David S. Mitchell, Jr., “Permissible Parameters of Parallel 
Proceedings,” Tennessee Bar Journal (2012): 22 // http://www.tba.org/journal/permissible-parameters-
of-parallel-proceedings. 
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facts. In other words, parallel proceedings can be called Double Trouble40 
proceedings that usually cause some kind of negative consequences. Parallel 
proceedings are well characterized by the so-called lis pendens principle41 of civil 
jurisprudence according to which proceedings are considered to be overlapping if 
the participants of the proceedings (persona), the object of their dispute (petitum), 
and circumstances of the dispute (causa petendi) overlap and the merits of the 
cases are neighboring in nature.42 Here it is worth mentioning that some authors 
consider the proceedings to be negative in their nature and emphasize the “dark 
side” of the proceedings, such as the risk of two contradictory court decisions being 
passed, waste of resources, and potential damage. This makes it clear that even 
homogenous proceedings in analogous cases might result in undesirable 
consequences43. Most of the sources indicate that all parallel proceedings have one 
common characteristic, namely, that there are no obstacles at the factual, legal, 
competence or sovereignty level to start, sustain, or end the proceedings.44 Thus 
the proceedings subjected to analysis are autonomous, identical, or at least slightly 
similar. Only the proceedings that can be consolidated, irrespective of the stage 
they are in, are clearly parallel.45 
Previous deliberations make us doubt the appropriateness of the concept of 
parallel proceedings provided for in Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA as a 
precondition for effective prevention and settling of conflicts of exercise of 
jurisdiction. We should avoid concluding that the lack of exhaustive definition in the 
aforementioned document can be “compensated for” with the help of any legal 
interpretations, analogies, or systemic interpretation, etc. In order to avoid the 
“flexible” nature of key underlying concepts which would allow any interpretation 
thereof “depending on the situation,” it would be advisable to finalize the definition 
of the concept that is to help European Union member states to reach consensus. 
Once the authors dare to state the definition of parallel proceedings held in 
Framework Decision, it is not methodologically so clear. The analysis of the ne bis 
in idem principle, in the context of the conflicts of jurisdiction as well as the logical 
analysis of the concept of parallel proceedings as a whole, acts as a reason to 
deduce features of parallel proceedings. 
                                           
40 Walter P. Loughlin, “Fighting On Two Fronts: Parallel Proceedings and Challenges at the Intersection of 
Criminal and Civil Law,” The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel (October, 2006): 32. 
41 In case of international proceedings lis pendens allows the court to refuse to hear the case if the same 
case is pending in a foreign court, which helps avoid parallel litigation in courts of different member 
states (Jugita Grigienė, “Forum Non Conveniens doktrina ir jos taikymas teismų praktikoje” [The 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and its Application in Court Practice], Jurisprudencija 51(43) (2004)). 
42 Anait Sergejevna Smbatyan, “Parallel judicial proceedings problem in international law,” Russian 
Juridical Journal 81 (6) (2011): 25. 
43 Gabrielle Kaufmannn-Kohler, “How to Handle Parallel Proceedings: a Practical Approach to Issues such 
as Competence and Anti-Suit Injunctions,” Dispute Resolution International 2 (1) (2008): 110. 
44 Tony Lewis, “Double trouble,” The Lawyer 17 (2008): 32. 
45 Campbell McLachlan, Lis pendens in International Litigation (Hague: Academy of International Law, 
2009), 63. 
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The consolidated nature of the proceedings in question allows for the claim 
that proceedings can be considered parallel only if they have the following 
minimum features. First of all, they have to be homogenous (criminal). Second, 
they have to be ongoing in two or more member states. Third, the stage of the 
proceedings is of no importance. The important thing is that they are ongoing. 
Fourth, there is a link between the proceedings in terms of circumstances attributed 
to the same case. Fifth, the proceedings have been initiated against the same 
individual. Sixth, member states dealing with the conflict of exercise of jurisdiction 
shall reach a mutual agreement on the fact that the legal proceedings are identical 
judging from national substantive or procedural criminal law point of view.  The 
latter feature suggests that, on the one hand, clearly not all proceedings that are 
similar from the procedural point of view are parallel if they are not qualified as 
identical in line with the national criminal law of respective member states. On the 
other hand, however, not all proceedings that are similar from the substantive point 
of view are parallel if they are not qualified as identical in line with the national 
criminal procedure law of respective member states. For example, it is possible to 
have a legal situation where proceedings that are ongoing in two member states 
may not have the features of parallel proceedings despite the fact that they involve 
the same circumstances and have been initiated against the same individuals, 
because of essential differences in the legal assessment of the same material facts 
despite the fact that in both member states certain acts are considered to be 
criminal. This is explained by differences in the nature of crime, the objects of crime 
may not be homogenous, different statutes of limitation for filing a criminal case 
might apply, etc. Moreover, criminal proceedings will not be perceived as parallel if 
it is established that even though the circumstances are the same and the plaintiffs 
are the same in both cases, in one of the member states involved there are also 
other plaintiffs full involvement of which in the proceedings serves as a precondition 
for a fair trial, etc. Finally, proceedings can only be perceived as parallel if are at 
least slightly similar in the form of evidence collection and documentation, including 
similarity of procedural form. 
Whether at least one of the aforementioned features exists or not, the issue 
of conflict of exercise of jurisdiction remains unsolved, just like the risk of practical 
difficulties in harmonizing jurisdictions. Some authors claim that even if all features 
of parallel proceedings are there, theoretically “friction” between member states 
may still arise. It may be determined by certain practical difficulties that currently 
exist due to, first of all, still existing essential differences in national legal systems 
of member states. The second reason is that there are still numerous tries to 
initiate discussions about the demeaning of sovereignty (identity) of a member 
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state by being forced to abandon one’s national jurisdiction and hand a particular 
case over to another jurisdiction.46 
Therefore, it is evident that previously described legal difficulties related to 
conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in essence arise from the existing lack of mutual 
trust between European Union member states in the process of implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition that is already well-entrenched in the European 
Union criminal justice. In other words, the search for features of parallel 
proceedings may lead us to the precipice of application of the ne bis in idem 
principle if mutual recognition of non-identical national legal systems fails in 
practice in the area of law enforcement and judicial institutions. 
3. MUTUAL RECOGNITION AS A WAY TO OVERCOME CONFLICTS OF 
JURISDICTIONS 
Mutual recognition as a way to overcome conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings that are simultaneously ongoing in several member states is 
to be viewed as a way to affect the national law and as a feature characteristic of 
the European Community and recognized to be a cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation47 that stipulates an important shift towards a more flexible legal 
regulation48. The science of European criminal justice says that the principle of 
mutual recognition on the European Union level is characterized by the fact that it 
enables court decisions in criminal cases to be directly enforced throughout the 
Community. Mutual recognition enables to believe that there is no need to adapt 
the final decision of the national court of the member state that passed it to the 
national laws of the member state which will recognize and enforce it.49 Scientific 
literature also says that the origins of mutual recognition stem from the 
development of the Community’s internal market, especially with the decision of 
the European Union Court of Justice in the case of Cassis de Dijon dealing with the 
free movement of goods within the Community. The court said that mutual 
recognition is perceived as one of the key regulatory principles of the Community 
law ensuring that all fundamental rights are entrenched. Based on this precedent, 
K. Karsai developed the theory of free movement of court decisions in criminal 
                                           
46 Polyvios Panayides, supra note 38, 114. 
47 Raimundas Jurka, supra note 37, 96-104. 
48 Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, “Teisės integravimas į Europos integracijos tyrimus Lietuvoje: teisinio 
reguliavimo problematika stojant į ES” [Integration of Law into European Integration Researches in 
Lithuania: Problems of Legal Regulation while Accessing to EU], Teisės problemos 4(42) (2003): 53. 
49 Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, “European Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters,” European Law Journal 9(5) 
(2003): 623. Mutual trust as the corner stone in European Union criminal justice is also widely analyzed 
in the researches of author V. Mitsilegas (Valsamis Mitsilegas, “The Symbiotic Relationship Between 
Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice,” Legal Studies Research Paper 
207 (2015) // http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632892). 
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cases50 and claimed that all decisions in criminal proceedings of international nature 
must be based on this theory to avoid cases when proceedings themselves become 
a burden to member states and the entire Community, because the theory helps 
make the best use of the proceedings as an economic, effective, and quick tool. 
Based on this idea it is possible to claim that the conflict of exercise of jurisdiction 
in criminal proceedings must also be based on free consultations, good will, and 
mutual trust. 
The scientific sources that deliberate on the principle contain more than mere 
apologetic statements. Some scientists suggest discussing the monopolist nature of 
the principle of mutual recognition in the European Union legal area. It is claimed 
that the EU borrowed this principle from the EU single market domain and applied it 
in the area of rights, freedoms, and justice to solve cooperation issues between 
member states, especially with the aim of harmonizing criminal law in the broader 
sense (including the conflict of exercise of jurisdiction). It is perceived as a kind of 
isomorphism as from the structural point of view the elements of the principle 
subjected to analysis are identical both within the framework of single market and 
criminal justice.51 One may ask, what is the goal of mutual recognition, what is its 
object and what effect does it have on the mutual relations between member 
states, and how does it help to prevent and solve conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction 
in case of parallel criminal proceedings? Only when answers to the above questions 
are clear will it be possible to understand the fundamental differences in the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the areas of the single market 
and justice. 
Speaking about the goals of mutual recognition, it becomes evident that 
international cooperation in criminal proceedings is meant to promote the free 
movement of court decisions and their recognition in the European Union member 
states by at the same time trying to avoid the infringement of the ne bis in idem 
principle. It is obvious that there is no reason to doubt the conclusions of the 
informal meeting of the ministers of justice and home affairs that took place on 
September 20-22, 2006, in Tampere during the Finnish presidency of the EU 
Council. The conclusions were aimed at speeding up the recognition of decisions 
passed by national courts and at ensuring their validity in other European Union 
member states.52 In defining the essence of this form of cooperation, s. Lavenex 
                                           
50 Krisztina Karsai, “The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters, Zbornik radova Pravnogo fakulteta u Novom Sadu 1-2 (2008): 949. 
51 Sandra Lavenex, “Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy,” 
Journal of European Policy 14 (5) (2007): 762-763. 
52 At the informal meeting of the EU ministers of justice and home affairs, which took place on 20-22 
September 2006 in Tampere (Finland), Finland presented a new document on the improvement of the 
process of decision making in the area of justice and home affairs. The document maintained that the 
recent lack of efficiency in the decision making (and implementation) process in the area of justice and 
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claims that the effect of this instrument affecting the national law on the domestic 
market and in the area of justice is not the same. The process of integration of the 
single market is aimed at social cohesion, and mutual recognition allows 
strengthening the role of the private sector and individual consumer rights, while 
the influence of member states in the process is rather limited.  In the area of 
justice, however, it does not provide impetus for the expansion of individual’s rights 
vis-à-vis the state. This form of cooperation strengthens the international 
movement and recognition of sovereign acts adopted by executive or judicial 
institutions of member states which enables a pragmatic assessment of criminal 
proceedings with the aim to establish whether they are to be perceived as similar, 
i.e. parallel. 
In answering the question of how to define the object of mutual recognition in 
the said two areas, it is considered that from the economic point of view mutual 
recognition allows for the recognition of rules of another member stated applicable 
to products and methods of manufacture. In the case of Cassis de Dijon (1979), the 
ECJ formed a principle in line with which sale of any product that has been legally 
produced and placed on sale in any of the member states in a fair way and by 
following the rules and manufacturing processes of that particular member state 
must be allowed on the market of all member states. This constitutes the principle 
of mutual recognition of certain rules among member states in the absence of 
harmonization.53 In the legal context, this form of recognition encompasses the 
decisions taken by both executive and judicial powers, including their handover to 
another member state and recognition. It even goes further than that and entails 
the recognition of the domestic (national) law of another member state as a result 
of which judicial decisions taken within the framework of another member states 
                                                                                                                           
home affairs became especially visible (especially in the IIIrd pillar, i.e. police and judicial cooperation). 
In order to solve the problem, a suggestion was made to make use of the possibilities provided for in the 
founding Treaty of the EU and to change the decision making process in the IIIrd pillar, i.e. to give up on 
the requirement to have all decisions passed unanimously and to adopt the Community decision-making 
model instead, where, following consultations with the European Parliament, decisions are adopted by 
qualified majority. For more information, please, see “Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės veiklos Europos 
integracijos srityje 2006 m. apžvalga” [The Overview of Lithuanian Republic Government activity In 
European Integration 2006] (2007) // 
http://www.euro.lt/documents/es_dokumentai/apzvalga%2020070319.pdf. 
53 The explanation given by the ECJ in the case of Cassis de Dijon formed the court practice, i.e. 
entrenched the principle that the sale of any product that has been legally produced and placed on sale 
in any of the member states in a fair way and by following the rules and manufacturing processes of that 
particular member state must be allowed on the market of all member states. This was the main motive 
that encouraged discussions on the principle of mutual recognition, including cases where harmonisation 
is non-existent. Therefore, member states must allow the circulation and placing on the market of the 
goods that have been legally manufactured and placed on the market of any other member state even in 
the absence of European harmonisation tools (secondary EC law), except for the cases when compulsory 
requirements shall apply. In the latter case every applicable measure shall be analysed in great detail in 
line with the principles of necessity and proportionality. According to the Single Market Action Plan 
adopted in 1997, the principle of mutual recognition formed the basis for improving the efficiency of the 
internal market. For more information, please, see “Laisvas prekių judėjimas” [Free Movement of Goods] 
(2011) // http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/market/market/article_7191_lt.htm. 
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national law are interpreted as if they were adopted by the member state that is 
enforcing them.54 
S. Lavenex doubts whether mutual recognition in criminal proceedings on the 
European Union level is actually so reliable and efficient as it is presented. The 
author claims that it is not effective enough when it comes to the actual trust of 
member states in each other’s national legal systems. The biggest doubts are 
caused by the fact that the mutual recognition and enforcement of decisions taken 
by national courts lacks sufficient description of material facts and additional 
information that is necessary to be able to recognize and enforce the decision of 
another member state’s national court.55 All of it recalls mutual relations that are 
based on mutual trust, without even getting to know the person in which the trust 
is invested. As a result one may ask if this is enough in the context of human rights 
protection. 
It would be possible to justify the mutual recognition and trust of the kind if it 
were followed by a coherent functioning of other means by which the European 
Union law affects the national laws of member states, such as harmonization of the 
European Union and national law, etc.56 Thus, mutual recognition could be reliable 
only if legal systems of different members states are at least similar in terms of 
procedural guarantees extended to individuals. As a result of discussions, there is a 
tendency to base legal cooperation on mutual recognition alone, which naturally 
makes further relations of law enforcement institutions easier and speeds up the 
recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions as well as makes it more efficient. 
In a way, mutual recognition gains advantage against legal harmonization as the 
latter is more complicated, because it is aimed at harmonizing minimum legal 
requirements (standards) applicable in criminal proceedings throughout the 
European Union member states. It is not an easy task, because it involves finding 
compromise in the context of the multitude of national legal systems, traditions and 
cultures. Nonetheless, it is necessary to do so, because the current form of mutual 
recognition where national courts are forced to trust and execute the judicial 
decisions taken by a judicial institution of another member state “without even 
questioning it”57 results in a deadlock in cases when at least one of the parties to 
the proceedings starts doubting whether the mutual recognition of the kind is at all 
possible knowing that the provisions of criminal proceedings safeguarding the 
procedural guarantees for the suspects and the plaintiffs differ in every European 
Union member state in terms of procedural form and implementation. 
                                           
54 Sandra Lavenex, supra note 51: 765. 
55 Ibid.: 774. 
56 Ibid. 
57 John R. Spencer, “EU Fair Trial Rights – Progress at Last,” New Journal of European Criminal Law 1 (4) 
(2000): 448. 
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It is important to understand that efficient application of the principle of 
mutual recognition and the resulting prevention of conflicts of exercise of 
jurisdiction in case of parallel proceedings is possible only in cases where criminal 
proceedings instituted against the same person on the basis of the same 
circumstances in two or more member states safeguard, at least to some extent, 
uniform procedural guarantees for the suspects (plaintiffs). In addition, 
safeguarding of minimum legal requirements (standards) applicable to criminal 
proceedings in all European Union member states results in effective and highly 
performing direct consultations between competent institutions of the member 
states that are solving conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction. Lack of mutual 
recognition that can be determined by differences in legal proceedings applicable in 
criminal cases prevent the application of the ne bis in idem principle. The Green 
Paper states about conflicts of jurisdiction and the principle of ne bis in idem in 
criminal proceedings that: 
An adequate response to the problem of (positive) conflicts of jurisdiction would 
be to create a mechanism for allocating cases to an appropriate jurisdiction. 
Where prosecutions are concentrated in a single jurisdiction, an issue of ne bis in 
idem would no longer arise. Moreover, such a mechanism would complement the 
principle of mutual recognition, which provides that a judicial decision taken in 
one Member State is recognised and - where necessary – enforced by other 
Member States.58 
How could it be otherwise? Criminal proceedings that seem to be identical at 
first glace, but appear to have substantial differences in terms of their procedural 
form, serve as a simple example of the “lack of agreement” between the 
jurisdictions of the European Union member states. 
We argue that merely formally parallel criminal proceedings will never actually 
become parallel if they are not mutually recognized as idem per idem. It will only 
be possible to overcome this obstacle when the idea of the European Investigation 
Order59 is universally applied in practice. This will be the beginning of the end of 
breaches related to the ne bis in idem principle. 
                                           
58 Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings, 
supra note 34. 
59 The authors emphasize, the gist of legal regulation of Directive 2014/41/EU is not the target to analize 
in this article. Authors refrain to go into deep of analysis of this Directive, whereas this Directive needs 
attention for special comprehensive research. But for the purposes of this article, it should be 
mentioned, that scholars Emilio De Capitani and Steve Peers stated: 
The adoption of Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order (EIO) is a 
milestone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the European Union notably after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This 
post focusses in turn on the broader legal context of the new Directive, its territorial scope 
in light of various opt-outs, and its important provisions on the relationship between 
human rights and mutual recognition. As from 22 May 2017, this Directive replaces most 
of the existing laws in a key area of judicial cooperation – the transfer of evidence 
between Member States in criminal cases – by a single new instrument which will make 
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Thus, parallel proceedings are those that are identical both “from the outside” 
and “from the inside”, i.e. the member states involved in parallel proceedings can 
trust, for example, the form of the procedural rules applied by another member 
state in collecting and documenting respective evidence that will be handed over to 
the court of another member state and will be assessed by it as if they were 
collected in line with the laws of the member state that institutes the proceedings. 
It is absolutely necessary to try implementing the ne bis in idem requirements 
and avoid the unwanted consequences, such as the fiasco of criminal justice in 
cases when the litigation process is handed over from one member state to another 
where the national court will face the problem of admissibility of evidence collected 
in a foreign member state (which handed over the litigation). In addition it is critical 
to understand that this particular principle is focused both on the safeguarding of 
procedural guarantees applicable to the plaintiff and the unavoidability of liability. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of solutions meant to prevent conflict of exercise of jurisdiction in 
the criminal proceedings of the European Union member states shows that the key 
objective and purpose of the idea is to institute the functional effectiveness of the 
ne bis in idem principle. The values that form the basis for the application of this 
principle entail the risk that in case of parallel proceedings that are ongoing in 
several different member states the human rights and freedoms protected by 
various conventions and domestic law will be breached as a result of repeated 
criminal prosecution. Therefore, the fundamental interpretation of the ne bis in 
idem principle must be rather broad despite differences in qualification determined 
by national legal traditions; however, the sovereignty of the member state’s 
national legal systems, including the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, 
must not be ignored. 
Only in their entirety do respective criteria allow for the conclusion that the 
proceedings that are ongoing in two or more European Union member states are to 
be perceived as parallel. To be more exact, these proceedings are identical in type, 
they are ongoing in two or more member states irrespective of their stage or 
phase, they are related in terms of the same merits of the case, instituted against 
the same person (suspect, plaintiff) and, finally, the states involved in the 
proceedings mutually agree that the legal proceedings are identical judging by 
certain features of the national substantial law or law of criminal procedure. In 
                                                                                                                           
cross-border investigations faster and more efficient (Emilio De Capitani and Steve Peers, 
“The European Investigation Order: A new approach to mutual recognition in criminal 
matters” (Friday, 23 May 2014) // http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-
european-investigation-order-new.html). 
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other words, in order to avoid breaching the ne bis in idem principle, the 
proceedings that are at least in some way similar in their form are considered to be 
parallel proceedings. 
Mutual recognition by the member states of each other’s legal systems based 
on total and entirely pragmatic mutual trust turns out to be the key indicator in 
preventing the conflict of exercise of jurisdiction in practice. This methodological 
legal instrument adopted to eliminate the conflict of exercise of jurisdiction gives 
rise to the cooperation of member states in criminal proceedings both formally and 
in terms of basic values. 
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